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"My keenest interest is excited, not by what are called great questions and
great cases, but by little decisions which the common run of selectors would pass
by because they did not deal with the Constitution or a telephone company, yet
which have in them the germ of some wider theory, and therefore of some pro-
found interstitial change in the very tissue of the law."--OLIvER WENDELL HOLMES,
COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS (1920) 269.
Comments
ABOLITION OF WRITS OF ERROR
At common law, a writ of error was an original writ issuing out of the
Chancery and would lie, as a matter of right, where a party was aggrieved, by a
judgment of a common law court of record." It was in the nature of a commission
to the judges of the superior court to examine the record upon which the judg-
ment was rendered and to affirm or reverse the same, according to law.2 While
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appeals have been frequently declared to be of a statutory nature, they were not
statutory in origin under the English law. They were employed without statutory
authority to review Chancery cases by the House of Lords,3 and later to review
decrees of admiralty and ecclesiastical courts. Appeals were deemed to be a con-
tinuation of the case, while writs of error were in the nature of a new action.4
Under the present statutory procedure in Missouri, either appeals or writs of
error may be used to review cases of either equitable and legal nature.5 Both are
a matter of right under the statutes.; The bill .of exception procedure has been
extended to appeals. 7 The writ of error issues out of the appellate court while
the appeal is allowed by the trial court s Though the distinction is not vital for
most practical purposes, the appeal is still regarded as a continuation of the suit
while the writ of error is a new action. For these reasons appeal is the manner
employed in the great majority of cases. The only substantial advantage a writ
of error has is that it may be taken out within one year, while the ordinary appeal
must be allowed within the term.
The new Civil Code of Missouri, which becomes effective January 1, 1945,
simplifies appellate practice as well as other ihases of civil procedure. Section
125(a) of the Civil Code provides as follows:
"Writs of error are abolished in civil cases. Review shall be by appeal, which
shall constitute a continuation of the proceedings in the trial court and be deemed
to present all issues which heretofore have been presented by writ of error and
appeal."
This unification of the methods of review has met with general approval by
the bar. However, in an unpublished memorandum one member of the bar has
asserted that the writ of error can not be abolished under the constitution. The
matter is of sufficient interest and importance to warrant a thorough examination.
The principal provision of the Missouri Constitution thought to give rise to
doubt as to the constitutionality of the proposal to abolish writs of error is Sec-
tion 3 of Article VI:
"The Supreme Court shall have a general superintending control over all
inferior courts. It shall have power to issue writs of habeas corpus, nandamus,
quo warranto, certiorari and other original remedial writs, and to hear and determine
the same."
3. 1 Holdsworth, History of Englisk Law (1931) 372-375. Cf. Arkansas &
Okla. R.R. v. Powell, 104 Mo. App. 362,367, 80 S. W. 336,337 (1904) and cases
infra note 27.
4. Williams, Appellate Practice (1942) 7 Mo. L. REv. 158, 164-165.
5. Id. at 159.
6. Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) § 1184, 1200.
7. Mo. REV. STAT. (1939) H§ 1174 to 1183. See Williams, supra note 4
at 160.
8. Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) H9 1187-1188, 1200.
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Practically identical provisions were contained in the constitutions of 1820
and 1865.10 Other sections deal with matters of appellate review," but, with one
exception,12 they have only incidental bearing on the matter in hand. Writs of
error are mentioned in several places in the constitution but not in such a way as
to require their continuance as a method of appellate review."1
On its face, the above quoted constitutional provision does not seem to pre-
serve any right of appellate review by writ of error or any other manner. It deals
only with the powers of the supreme court. The writ of error was an original
writ at common law1 4 and hence literally comes within the phrase "other original
remedial writs," though' if that were intended it is strange indeed that the most
usual common law writ employed to review decisions of trial courts is not given
a place in the specific enumeration of writs. The superintending control of inferior
courts mentioned in the first sentence of the Section does not sound like a grant of
power to review all actions at law by writ of error, and all suits in equity by
appeal. It may or may not authorize judicial rule-making, which power the
supreme court has never exercised; but as concerns the issuance of writs it does
not seem to have been intended to do any more than authorize the court to hold
inferior courts within bounds of their jurisdiction by means of such extraordinary
writs as those expressly mentioned in the second sentence.' 5
Turning to the case authorities on the subject, the first decision is contained
in the, first volume of the Missouri reports. It is Blunt v. Sheppard,'0 which was
writ of error to review a judgment at law for $84.00. The question was wh~ether
writ of error would lie in view of an act'7 of the first General Assembly which
allowed appeals and writs of error only in cases where the amount in dispute was
equal to $100.00. The court declared that the constitution gave the right to all
people to have their causes reviewed by the supreme court without regard to
amount, and therefore the writ of error would lie notwithstanding the limitation
of the act. The court seems only concerned with the limitation of the right of
review and not with the procedural method. It is fairly implied that any form
of review which is a matter of right would have satisfied the court.
At the same term the same result was reached in Graves & Ravenscroft v.
Black,'" which was writ of error to review a judgment for defendant in an action
10. Except that in the earlier constitutions the words "of law" were included
at the end of the first sentence.
11. Art. VI, § 2, 12, 19, 20, 27; Am. 1884, H8 3, 5, 6, 7, 8; Am. 1890, § 1;
Schedule, § 7.
12. See infra note 18 and text following.
13. Art. VI, H§ 12, 20, 27; Am. 1884, § 5; Schedule, § 7. Provisions dividing
appellate jurisdiction between the supreme court and the courts of appeals
refer to appeals and writs of error but only in such way as to grant or withholdjurisdiction over these proceedings, if they are otherwise permitted by law.
14. 2 TDn, P.AcricE (2d Am. ed. 1828) 1188.
15. Consider in this connection Mo. CONsT. ART. VI, § 12.
16. 1 Mo. 219 (1822).
17. Mo. Laws 1820, c. xxxviii; § 5.
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at law to recover a $25.00 debt. The opinion in that case showed that the court
relied not only on the superintending control Section of the judiciary article, but
also, and perhaps principally, upon the Section which provided:
"The supreme court, except in cases otherwise directed by this constitution,
shall have appellate jurisdiction only, which shall be co-extensive with the state,
under the restrictions and limitations in this constitution provided."
This section, which has an identical counterpart in Section 2 of the judiciary
article of the present constitution, seems on its face only to prohibit the supreme
court from entertaining original jurisdiction except as directed by the constitu-
tion. However, from the standpoint of authority, it must be conceded that the
foregoing cases hold to the contrary.
A third early case is that of English, v. Mullanphy, 9 which was a writ of
error to review a judgment of nonsuit and the refusal to set aside the same in
an action of covenant. The court referred to the superintending control Section
of the judiciary article and stated that the statute regarding appeals and writs
of error neither intended to, nor could, abridge the appellate power of the court.
This language follows:
"If no mode in any case has been prescribed, this court would be bound to
exert its power, under the Constitution, of controlling the proceedings of inferior
courts, in such mode or by such writs, as would have been most convenient
and proper; and it doth seem to this court that the writ of error is the most con-
venient process that could be used."
This was said, of course, before there could be review by appeal in the action
at law. The implication seems clear, however, that if review by appeal were pro-
vided there would be no objection to an act which prohibited the writ of error.
St. Louis v. Marchel ° was an appeal by the city from a judgment of acquittal
upon the charge of violation of a city ordinance. There being no statutory
provision for* appeal in such cases, the court dismissed the appeal, saying:
"While the legislature may not properly deprive litigants of their right to have
such causes reviewed by this court, as fall within its constitutional jurisdiction
(Blunt v. Sheppard, 1 Mo. 219), yet the mode to be pursued in obtaining such
review is (speaking generally) a proper subject of legislative regulation. Where,
as here, a convenient and efficient one, by a writ of error, is available, no constitu-
tional right of plaintiff is infringed by the omission of the legislature to provide
for an appeal."
This is an even stronger intimation that had the statute provided that writ
of error would not lie but had allowed an appeal the statute would be valid.
The court in this case as in the previous cases is insisting on the substance of the
right of review and not the historical and common law distinction as to the
method of review. This position is reiterated in the dissenting opinion in the later
case of State v. Tkayer.21
19. 1 Mo. 780 (1827).
20. 99 Mo. 475, 12 S. W. 1050 (1889).
21. 158 Mo. 36, 55, 58 S. W. 12, 15 (1900).
1943] COMMENTS
4
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 8, Iss. 4 [1943], Art. 4
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol8/iss4/4
334 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8
It will be noted that the controverted Section of the new Civil Code fully
preserves by appeal the right of review heretofore presented by writ of error and
appeal. Furthermore, the very next Section of the bill provides:
"Any party to a suit aggrieved by any judgment of any trial court in any
civil cause from which an appeal is not prohibited by the Constitution, nor clearly
limited in special statutory proceedings, may take his appeal to a court having
appellate jurisdiction ..."
The substantial right of review in ordinary cases at law and in equity is pre-
served by these two Sections as completely as it is in the existing law. If statutes
regarding special proceedings prohibits review thereof, their provisions rather than
the provisions of the Civil Code are the ones which deny the right of review.
If the right of review exists under the constitution, the contrary special provisions
are void, leaving the matter to be governed by the Code, which gives a general
right of review.
Surely marked changes have been made in the writ of error since the adoption
of the first constitution, and the contention has never been made that the com-
mon law procedure of the writ cannot be altered. Does our fundamental law pre-
serve the form of ancient remedies when simpler, better ones continue all the
substance attached to former? Assume that our constitution expressly declared
that parties should be entitled to review by writ of error, what party could com-
plain of the substitution of the appeal, which gives a simpler, easier and more
complete remedy? Viewed in the aspect of the appellate court's power, what
court would insist on its power to issue a writ to acquire appellate jurisdiction,
when the statute gave parties the full right of review without obtaining any writ?
Bearing in mind that the writ has always been a matter of right, is the power
to issue a formal paper emblazoned with the court's seal necessary either to uphold
the court's constitutional power or its essential dignity?
From the standpoint of reason and good sense these questions call for neither
answer nor argument. Our fundamental law should be deemed to deal with sub-
stance and not with mere form. The authorities show this. In the celebrated case
of State v. Campbell22 the information concluded "against th'e peace and dignity
of State" while the constitution required informations to conclude "against the
peace and dignity of the State." The court held that this constitutional provision
was mandatory and on account of omission of "the" reversed the conviction. This
decision was subject not only to criticism but to ridicule as well, and thirteen years
later the rule was expressly overruled in State v. Adkins23 upon the grounds that
the constitution must be construed in the light of its purpose and that an appellant
may not complain when he is not prejudiced. It is a well recognized principle that
one who is not injured by a statutory provision may not question its constitution-
22. 210 Mo. 202, 109 S. W. 706 (1908).
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ality.2 ' Surely a person who is given a better method of review has no basis of
complaint that another traditional method is taken away.
Thus it seems clear that the legislature may abolish the writ of error provided
it retains the appeal, and no one could complain of the change even if our constitu-
tion had expressly preserved the writ of error, which it does not. It is interesting
to consider further whether the principle enunciated in the early Missouri decisions
that the legislature cannot abolish the right of review may be said to be still the
law of thq state. These cases have not been cited on this point by our appellate
courts for many years.25 Due process does not require any method of review.26
In more recent decisions,27 insisting on the observation of the statutorry require-
ments for review, there is possibly the implication that statutes might withhold
review altogether, although most of the holdings do not go that far. However, at
least one case 28 upholds a statute which forbids appeal from a judgment dissolving
a corporation and furthermore interprets the statute as denying writ of error as
well. Of course the judgment dissolving a corporation was not one known to the
common law and the case may be distinguishable on that ground, but the opinion
does not so restrict the ruling and seems to indicate an entire change of view-
point upon the question of a constitutional right to review.
Five conclusions follow from the foregoing discussion.
1. The constitution does not prevent abolition of writs of error, at least
if review by way of appeal is preserved.
2. Even if the constitution did preserve the writ of error, no one could
complain of the provision of the new Civil Code which abolishes the writ of error
but allows appeal wherever writ of error would lie formerly.
3. Though the early Missouri cases held that there was a constitutional
right of review in cases at law and suits in equity, the more recent decisions seem
to indicate that the legislature may curtail or entirely abolish all judicial review.
4. Even if the right of review cannot be abolished under the constitution
it is effectively preserved by the Civil Code in all cases at law and suits in equity.
5. In the only cases where the Civil Code contemplates absence of the right
of review-special statutory proceedings where the right has been clearly limited
by the legislature-there is clearly no constitutional right of review.
Thus no constitutional problems are presented by the provisions of the new
Civil Code which abolish writs of error. T. E. A.
24. 11 Am. Jur. 748.
25. See St. Louis v. March'el, supra note 20; Kansas City v. Bacon, 147 Mo.
259,311, 48 S. W. 860, 875 (1898); State v. Thayer, supra note 21.
26. McKane v. Durston, 153 U. S. 684, 14 S. Ct. 913 (1894); Pittsburgh,
Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Ry. v. Backus, 154 U. S. 421, 14 S. Ct. 1114 (1894);
Dorris Motor Co. v. Colburn, 307 Mo. 137, 270 S. W. 339 (1925).
27. Thomas v. Elliott, 215 Mo. 598, 114 S. W. 987 (1908); Bussiere's Admin-
istrator v. Sayman, 257 Mo. 303,165 S. W. 796 (1914); Hines v. Hook, 338 Mo.
114, 89 S. W. (2d) 52 (1935).
28. Dorris Motor Co. v. Colburn, 307 Mo. 137, 270 S. W. 339 (1925). See also
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